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California's Constitutional Right to
Privacy: The Development of the
Protection of Private Life
By ROBERT S. GERSTEIN*

Introduction
The right to privacy has received rich but fragmented treatment by
the United States Supreme Court over the past twenty years. Founded

not on a single constitutional provision but on various implications of
and "emanations" from the Bill of Rights, I the right to privacy has yet
to be interpreted in a comprehensive fashion.2 Developments have
taken one path in the field of search and seizure3 and another in the

realm of regulating private life.4 As a result, protection in both spheres
seems to be given or withheld for reasons that are neither principled
nor predictable.' But the Supreme Court interpretations of the Federal
Bill of Rights are not the only bases for developing our fundamental
rights. Increasingly, state courts have found an alternative basis for

developing the right to privacy6 in their own state constitutions.7 Call* Professor of Political Science, University of California, Los Angeles; Member, California Bar. B.A., 1961, University of California, Los Angeles; LL.B., 1964, Harvard University; Ph.D., 1967, University of California, Los Angeles.
The author wishes to thank Professors Thomas Schrock, Steven Shiffrin, and Robert
Welsh for their comments on earlier drafts, and Helen Sledge for her research assistance.
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Hutchins Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, University of California, Santa Barbara.
1. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
2. As one commentator has written, "Privacy is a legal wall badly in need of mending." Gerety, Redfning Privacy, 12 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 234, 234 (1977). The critiques
are many. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wof A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE
LJ.920 (1973).
3. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
5. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,
416 U.S. 1 (1974); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975),
ajf'dmem, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
6. See Cope, TowardaRight ofPrivacyas a Maler ofState ConstitutionalLaw, 5 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 671 (1977).

.

7. See Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of IndividualRights, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 489 (1977).
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fornia is among those states that have an explicit constitutional right to
privacy8 and therefore need not rely on emanations as a basis for analysis. This gives the right a more secure foundation and a better chance
to achieve coherence in California than it has had at the federal level.

California courts have given substantial attention to their right to
privacy, and a gradually emerging coherence can now be discerned.
This development continues to be hampered, however, by adherence to

the conceptual division between search and seizure law on the one
hand and the regulation of private life on the other, as well as by the

continued dominance of the federally based "reasonable expectation of
privacy" theory in the search and seizure realm. It is one of the principle contentions of this article that this theory is fundamentally misdirected and that it should be replaced by a unified approach which
would give California the basis for the protecting private life from both
unreasonable searches and seizures and unjustified regulations.
Part I of this article subjects the prevailing doctrine of privacy, as

embodied in the reasonable expectation theory, to critical analysis.
Part II outlines the process by which the California courts have paved

the way for a break with the reasonable expectation theory through
their independent development of the values that underlie the right of

privacy. Next, two cases, People v. Maxie9 and De Lancie v. Superior
Court,1" in which California courts have taken a major step toward
rejecting the reasonable expectation approach, are discussed. These
8. CAL. CONST., art. I, § I provides: "All people are by nature free and independent
and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy."
9. 165 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Ct. App. 1980), hearinggranted,Crim. No. 21556 (Sup. Ct. July 16,
1980). [Editor's note: As of publication People v. Maxie had not been officially set for argument].
Where the California Supreme Court grants a hearing after decision by the state district
court of appeal, the cause is removed in its entirety from the court of appeal and the decision
and opinion of the court of appeal are rendered a nullity, without force as precedent or as an
authoritative statement of the law. Ponce v. Marr, 47 Cal. 2d 159, 161, 301 P.2d 837, 839
(1956). The court of appeal decision is not, therefore, reprinted in the California Official
Reports, and for that reason, may be found only in the unofficial West's CaifforniaRe orter.
After hearing has been granted by the California Supreme Court a tentative date is set
for argument. Following argument the cause is submitted by the court. The court must file
its opinion within ninety days of submission. CAL. CONST. art VI, § 19 ("[a] judge may not
receive [his or her judicial salary] while any cause before the judge remains pending. . . for
90 days after it has been submitted for decision"). Once filed, a decision by the court
becomes final within thirty days absent an extension of time for filing for a rehearing or the
grant of a rehearing. See CAL. R. CT. 24.
10. 159 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1979), hearinggranted,S.F. No. 24095 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 29,
1979), argument, (Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 1981). [Editor's note: As of publication De Lancie had
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cases, which uphold the privacy of visits to pretrial detainees on the
basis of California's constitutional right to privacy, point the way to
further clarification of the special character of values that the right of
privacy is to protect. Part III offers a proposal for a unified theory of
the right to privacy, a proposal which seems very much in harmony
with the California development, and explains how that theory provides a foundation for the decisions made in Maxie and DeLancie on
the privacy of pretrial detainees.
I.

The Right to Privacy and the Supreme Cqurt

The United States Supreme Court has developed no single coherent theory of privacy. In the tradition of Dean Prosser's famous article," it has taken on privacy issues piecemeal, dealing with each
without reference to the others. Publication of private matters by the
press has received the least attention, having been relegated to little
more than a footnote in the doctrine of libel under the First Amendment.' 2 In contrast, both governmental intrusions into private areas
and governmental regulation of private life have received substantial
development. Except for a critical connection in an early case involving the regulation of private life, 3 however, the law in these two areas
has evolved separately. Though theoretically sparse, the regulation
cases have developed a concern for the substance of those aspects of life
that are regarded as private. The intrusion cases, on the other hand,
have been dominated by a theory that is the center of interest here: the
reasonable expectation of privacy. What follows is a consideration and
critique of the reasonable expectation theory, followed by a brief summary of the developments in the regulation field. The contention is
that the division of the field and the consequent failure to take a coherent view of the privacy right have led to a fragmented and unsatisfying
theory of privacy.
not been submitted]. See note 9 supra, concerning the effect of the California Supreme
Court granting a hearing.
11. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
12. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975); Time, Inc. v. Hill,
385 U.S. 374 (1967).
13. Justice Douglas, in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965), suggested
that the right of married couples to use contraceptives was founded in the penumbra formed
by emanations from the Fourth Amendment, among others, and further implied that the
right rests in part upon the fact that to "allow the police to search the sacred precincts of the
marital bedroom" to enforce a prohibition of contraceptive use would be "repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."

388
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The Reasonable Expectation Theory

1.

Origins of the Reasonable Expectation Theory
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The reasonable expectation theory originated in Katz v. United
States 4 as an effort to expand the protection of the Fourth Amendment beyond the traditional limits of property rights. Katz had no
property right in the telephone booth from which he placed bets, yet a
majority of the Court was convinced that the tapping of these calls constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. The Court found that
Katz, by going into the telephone booth and closing the door, made an
effort to keep what he said private. The majority, through Justice Stewart, reasoned that because what is intentionally made public, even inside the home, is not protected, it follows that what is sought to be kept
private, even outside the home, is protected.' 5 Justice Stewart concluded that one who went into a telephone booth was "entitled to assume" that his words would be for the person at the other end of the
line alone; to "read the Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the
vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication."' 16 Justice Harlan, in his well-known concurrence, translated
this point into the language of reasonable expectation. He stated that
the theory that emerges from the case requires a subjective expectation
of privacy that "society is prepared to accept as 'reasonable.' "17
Justice Harlan's idea of reasonableness is relatively straightforward: a common sense understanding of the precautions needed to
keep things quiet.' 8 For instance, one should stay in one's house, go
into a telephone booth, not leave things out in an open field,' 9 nor talk
in the presence of people who are not entirely trustworthy.2 0 The language of reasonable expectation is interchanged easily with the language of assumption of risk.2 ' The question is whether or not one who
acts in a particular way assumes the risk that others will discover what
he wants to keep private. For example, the Court held in UnitedStates
v. White22 that one contemplating illegal activities undertakes the risk
that her conversations with her companions might be reported to the
14. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a discussion of the pre-Katz rule, see notes 25-28 and
accompanying text infra.
15. Id. at 351-52.
16. Id. at 352.
17. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
18. Id.
19. Id. Accord Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924).
20. See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
21. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 496A-496D (1958).
22. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
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authorities.23 That she does not realize she is taking the risk is a failure
of perception, from which she does not deserve protection.
The reasonable expectations theory has become a general theory
of the Fourth Amendment, perhaps of privacy in general, and is
founded on the idea that the Amendment protects the expectations of
sensible people who take reasonable precautions to keep things to
themselves. The infringement of the right to privacy means, then, the
disappointment of these expectations. The evil is understood to be the
distress occasioned by the disappointment, a distress which will vary
among individual cases depending on the extent of the expectation and
its particular significance to the individual holding it. If there is no
expectation, there is, quite obviously, no pain occasioned by its disappointment. Conversely, if the precautions taken are not sufficient to
justify a sensible person's formation of an expectation of privacy, then
the distress does not deserve legal recognition.24
What is missing from this analysis is any concern with the special
qualities ofprivacy. After all, expectations not involving privacy, such
as the expectation interest of the promisee in a contractual relationship
are, if disappointed, likely to cause people pain. The substance of privacy is ignored in favor of a consideration of the pain occasioned by
disappointment. The historical purpose of the reasonable expectation
approach was to escape the strictures of formalistic property analysis
and to affirm that the Fourth Amendment "protects people, not
places."' 2 The path the Court took in doing this was to assume that
houses are protected from invasion because and to the extent that they
generate a reasonable expectation of privacy, and then to generalize
23. Id. at 752.
24. The language used by the courts in a number of cases supports this view: "[T]he
teaching of Katz v. United States. . ..[is] that the interest protected by the Fourth Amendment is reasonable expectation of privacy." United States v. Vilhotti, 323 F. Supp. 425, 431
(S.D.N.Y.) (citations omitted), afdin part and rev'dinpart,452 F.2d 1186 (2d Cir. 1971);
"De Forte still could reasonably have expected that only those persons and their personal or
business guests would enter the office, and that records would not be touched except with
their permission or that of union higher-ups. This expectation was inevitably defeated by
the entrance of state officials, their conduct of a general search, and their removal of records
which were in De Forte's custody." Mancusi v. De Forte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968); "If the
conduct and revelations of an agent operating without electronic equipment do not invade
the defendant's constitutionally justifiable expectations of privacy, neither does a simultaneous recording of the same conversation. .. ." United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751
(1971); "[Tlhe Fourth Amendment.. .protects people from unreasonable government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of privacy." United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S.
1, 7 (1977).
25. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 351.
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this protection, extending
it wherever people have a reasonable expec6
tation of privacy.
This approach errs in its basic assumption. It is not true that
houses are protected from invasion only because and to the extent that
they create a reasonable expectation of privacy. They are protected
because of the value of what happens inside them: They are the seat of
private life. To mistake expectations for the substance of the privacy
values that the Fourth Amendment has traditionally protected is to
continue making the error which the Court in Katz believed its predecessors had made by maintaining the technicalities of property ownership as the limits of Fourth Amendment protection-to mistake the
outer shell for the substance within.
Thus, the error in the earlier approach has not been corrected but
generalized. Katz is an improvement over Olmstead v United States2 7
and even Silverman v. United States,2 8 both of which required the physical presence of electronic surveillance on a suspect's property before
finding a search. The improvement, however, was made in a way that
continues to mislead us about the values which are really to be protected and to dilute the broad protection the Fourth Amendment offers.
2. Liberatingthe Negative Implications of the Reasonable
Expectation Theory
It has taken some time, but Justice Black's dire warnings that the
use of the privacy formula would lead one day to a dilution of Fourth
Amendment protection29 have turned out to be accurate. In a recent
series of cases beginning with Rakas v. Illinois30 and culminating in
Rawlings v. Kentucky,3" the Supreme Court firmly has taken the view
that Fourth Amendment rights begin and end with individual expectations of privacy.
The negative effect of the reasonable expectation theory was
delayed by Jones v. United States,3 2 in which the Court took a relatively generous approach to the requirement that a defendant be "aggrieved" by the unreasonable search and seizure before he can exclude
26. Id.
27. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (wiretap not a search because it did not involve a trespass to
property).
28. 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (electronic eavesdropping held to be a search because it involved the use of a "spike mike" which made contact with the heating duct in the suspect's
house when driven through a party wall).
29. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 364-74 (Black, J., dissenting); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
31. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
32. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
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the fruits of it from evidence."3 Jones involved the search for and
seizure of drugs from an apartment in which Jones had been only a
visitor for the night.34 The Supreme Court held that Jones had standing to move to suppress the evidence. First, he had automatic standing
simply because he was charged with the act of possessing the seized
material; to hold otherwise would compel him to admit guilt by asserting a possessory interest in the drugs in order to argue for their exclusion.3" Second, Jones' status as a guest did not bar him from contesting
the search because "anyone legitimately on premises where a search
occurs may challenge its legality."36 Under this approach, there would
be no need to make a minute examination of the privacy expectations
of people in a private home because any of them could assert the interests of any other, including the owner, in contesting a search. This
broad reading of the aggrievement requirement kept the reasonable expectation theory's negative implications, its potential for narrowing the
scope of privacy, from surfacing for some time.
37
The dismantling of the Jones doctrine began in Rakas v. Illinois.
First, the Court held that a separate consideration of standing should
be dispensed with, so that the sole question is "whether the challenged
search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment rights of a criminal
38
defendant who seeks to exclude the evidence obtained during it."
Second, the Court held that the question of whether one's Fourth
Amendment rights are violated by a search of a place is not to be determined in accordance with Jones, by determining whether the criminal
defendant was "legitimately" on the premises, but rather by determinshe has "a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
ing whether or '3not
9
place."
invaded
In Rakas the passengers of a car asserted the right to exclude objects found in a search under the car seat and into its glove compartment.40 The Court held that the passengers had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in these places and therefore could not move to
33. Notwithstanding the generous reading in Jones, this requirement restricts the use of
the exclusionary rule much more than, for example, California's approach, which allows the
defendant to argue for exclusion even if he was in no way injured by the search and seizure
itself. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1971).
34. 362 U.S. at 258-59.
35. Id. at 263.
36. Id. at 267.
37. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
38. Id. at 140.
39. Id. at 143.
40. Id. at 129.
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exclude the objects found there.4 The Court made it clear that its reasoning would apply not only to car searches but also to house searches.
For example, a casual visitor would have no reasonable expectation of
privacy in a basement he had not entered, and therefore could not contest the use of evidence found there.42

The work of Rakas was completed in the 1980 companion cases of
UnitedStates v. SaIvueei43 and Rawlings v. Kentucky.4 In Salvucci, the
defendant was charged with possession of stolen mail that was seized in
his mother's apartment. Although Salvucci would have had "automatic" standing under Jones,4 5 the Court rejected this automatic standing rule because of the impact of Simmons v. United States.' In that
case the Court held that a defendant's testimony at a suppression hearing may not be used against him at trial.47 Simmons eliminated the
jeopardy faced by one charged with possession who would argue for
suppression. According to the Court in Salvucci, this reasoning eliminated the need for automatic standing.4" The issue of standing became
once again a question of whether the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched areas. The crucial point in the
Court's reasoning was that the assumption that the mail was in the defendant's legal possession at the time of the search did not in itself establish any reasonable expectation of privacy.4 9 Thus, after Salvucci, it

is possible to search for an object even in someone's possession without
violating his privacy right.5 0
In Rawlings this reasoning was taken a step farther. Even if the
defendant asserts ownership of the object seized, she cannot challenge
the legality of the search unless it violated her reasonable expectation
of privacy."1 Rawlings put his bottles containing LSD and other drugs
into a purse belonging to Vanessa Cox shortly before the police arrived
to search the house. 52 The Court found that because another friend
had free access to the purse, because of the "precipitous nature" of the
41. Id. at 148-49.
42. Id. at 148.
43. 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
44. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
45. 448 U.S. at 83-84.
46. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
47. Id. at 394.
48. 448 U.S. at 84-85.
49. The Court remanded the case so that the trial court could consider whether or not
the defendants had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area of the home where the
goods were seized. Id. at 95.
50. Id. at 97.
51. 448 U.S. at 104-05.
52. Id. at 101.

Winter 1982]
Winter 19821

RIGHT TO PRIVACY
RVC

RGTT

transfer, and because of the "frank admission by the defendant that he
had no subjective expectation that Cox's purse would remain free from
intrusion," the defendant had no reasonable expectation
governmental
53
of privacy.
Elaborate rules of standing generally restrict a litigant's access to
the means of vindicating her rights. The rules established in Jones,
however, maintained older property concepts of Fourth Amendment
law for the purpose of broadening the ambit of its protection. Now
that these property concepts have been removed, nothing remains as a
basis for the Fourth Amendment right but the bare expectation of privacy by the individual who claims that her rights have been violated.
3. Consequences of the Reasonable Expectation Theory

A theory that deals merely with the extent of the expectations generated by sensible, or less than sensible, precautions cannot possibly
embrace all that is significant about invasions of privacy. The heart of
the evaluative issues raised by the assertion that privacy has been invaded is not addressed by a theory that is based on the reasonableness
of the efforts used to keep something private; as a result, the law of
privacy has been significantly distorted.
54
The decisions concerning search and surveillance of prisoners
exemplify the flaws in the reasonable expectation theory. The application of this model compels the conclusion that privacy is not violated
because no sensible detainee would have any reasonable expectation of
privacy. Detainees ought to realize that surveillance is "the order of
the day" in jail." The problem with this analysis is that it can be seen
to prove too much. If privacy is not violated where surveillance is the
order of the day, then the government can eliminate the problem of
invading privacy rights by making surveillance of the general population the order of the day. There is no disappointment of the expectation of privacy when the government makes it clear that there is no
privacy to respect.56
The Supreme Court has conceded the fallacy of the reasonable expectation theory if taken to this extreme. In Smith v. Maryland,57 for
53. Id. at 105.
54. See, eg., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139
(1962). For the earlier California decisions on this subject, see the cases cited in note 172
infra.
55. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
56. The point was forcefully made by Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. Rnv. 349, 384 (1974).
57. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
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example, the Court held that the monitoring of the numbers dialed
from Smith's home was not an invasion of his privacy, the Court, in a
footnote, recognized that situations can be "imagined" in which the
standard reasonable expectation approach would be inadequate."
These are situations in which actual expectations have been "conditioned" by "influences alien to well-recognized Fourth Amendment
freedoms," for example, a nationwide announcement of warrantless entries or hapless refugees from repression who expect their phones to be
tapped.5 9 Even in these situations, however, the expectation is not to be
entirely abandoned; rather, it is suggested that a "normative inquiry"
would have to be made to see whether or not a reasonable expectation
exists.6 °
That the problem is not merely one of the Supreme Court's
imagined "1984" horrors can be seen from the more commonplace example ofRawlings v. Kentucky. 6 1 The Court found that Rawlings did
not have a reasonable expectation of privacy because of testimony that
he did not think that the pills he put into an acquaintance's purse
would be safe from the police. 62 But why did he think this? If it was
because he believed that the law would not protect them, then we have
the oddity of an individual's uninformed view of the law being applied
to him as law. If, on the other hand, he believed that the pills would be
protected by law from police search, but assumed that the police would
not obey the law, we have the equally ironic situation of a man being
denied the protection of the law just because he doubted its efficacy.
While it is clear that the Court did not feel that it had to make a "normative" inquiry to determine whether or not Rawlings' expectations
were "conditioned" by alien influences, it is not apparent why his case
is any different from that of the paranoiac refugee.6 3
58. Id. at 740 n.5.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 448 U.S. 98.

62. Id. at 104 n.3.
63. The possibility of "alien influence" having affected the law of a sister state also was
not considered by the California Supreme Court in People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d
738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979). The court held that because the seizure of records of telephone calls made in Philadelphia were legal under the laws of that state, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy to be violated and therefore the records were admissible in
California even though such a seizure would have been illegal if made in California. Id. at
656, 602 P.2d at 748, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 828. Thus, the measure of a reasonable expectation,
and therefore, the right to privacy, is the law prevailing at the time and place of the purported invasion of the right to privacy. For a further discussion of Blair, see notes 162-64
and accompanying text infra.
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Justice Harlan, the author of the reasonable expectation theory,
has also acknowledged the difficulty with its wholesale application. In
his dissent in United States v. White," Harlan condemned such appli-

cation, arguing that because "it is the task of the law to form and project, as well as mirror and reflect, we should not, as judges, merely
recite the expectations and risks without examining the desirability of
saddling them upon society."65 Something more must be added to the
theory to make it work satisfactorily.
The most natural response to the complaint that something is
missing from the reasonable expectation theory is to import some element of evaluation into the concept of "reasonableness" itself and
thereby turn it into a concept of legitimacy.66 The addition of this element, however, can be used more readily to narrow privacy protection
than to expand it. Indeed, there must be some element of legitimacy to
limit the ambit of privacy expectations to be given protection. Not all
disappointed expectations are deserving of redress, even if reasonable
precautions have been taken.
The Court in Rakas v. Illinois67 gave the example of the burglar in
a summer cabin during the off-season: he has certainly taken sufficient
precautions to be reasonably sure that he will not be detected, but it is
clear that his expectation of privacy should not be protected.6 8 The
Court's insistence that the expectation must be legitimate in order to be
reasonable solves this problem, 69 but the solution causes other conceptual difficulties. If the perspective is one of subjective expectation, then
there must be another way of excluding a careful burglar, and others
like him, such as the rapist in a distant wilderness area. Were it not for
this theory, the question of legitimacy would never arise because no
one would have thought such people had any claim of privacy in the
first place.
That this legitimacy approach destroys the very basis of the right
to privacy should become immediately apparent. Traditional privacy
analysis deemed certain places to be private, and then protected from
surveillance whatever went on in them, unless the authorities had good
reason to believe that the activity was criminal. The legitimacy approach reverses the process. It asks whether or not it was legitimate
from the actor's point of view to expect privacy for this activity, and if
not, then surveillance is allowed even if the authorities have no good.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

401 U.S. 745 (1971).
401 U.S. at 786 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
See I W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SaizuRE § 2.1(d) (1978).
439 U.S. 128 (1978).
Id. at 143 n.12.
Id.
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basis for believing it criminal. 7 0 Taken to its limits, this approach
would have denied a reasonable expectation in Katz itself. Katz, after
all, knew that what he was doing was not legitimate; should any attention be given to his expectation of privacy, no matter what precautions
he took?
The Supreme Court has not taken the legitimacy concept this far,
but it has at times come close, particularly in those cases in which conversations are reported by undercover agents or transmitted by one of
the parties to them. For example, in Hoffa v. United States,71 Hoffa
and others were convicted of jury tampering on the basis of the testimony of Edward Partin, a government undercover agent in the Hoffa
camp. The Court held that Hoffa's Fourth Amendment rights were not
violated because he was not relying on the security of his hotel room,
but on "his misplaced confidence that Partin would not reveal his
wrongdoing. '72 Another example is United States v White. 73 A government informant concealed a radio transmitter on his person and
transmitted his conversations with White to other government agents.
Again, the testimony of the agents was held admissible. The Court in
these cases focused on the fact that the conversations had a criminal
content and therefore, those involved in them could not legitimately
expect that the conversations would remain private. Because the person involved knew that what he was doing was wrong, the government
agents did not need to have any objective reason to believe the conduct
was illegal in order to put him under surveillance.74 To this extent, the
standard Fourth Amendment probable cause doctrine is abandoned,
provided, at least, that the people the police are after turn out to be
villains. Application of this doctrine finds protectable privacy interests
only for those who know themselves to be deserving and therefore allows our after-the-fact knowledge that the object of a search is a wrongdoer to influence our judgment of the legitimacy of the search. A right
to privacy that protects only actions deserving of protection and that
fails to establish a realm of general security within which people, deserving or not, can feel safe from intrusion unless the authorities have
some objectively established justification for intrusion, is no right to
privacy at all.
The legitimacy approach, at its worst, allows the reasonable expectation idea to become a vehicle for popular hostility to the "criminal
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See, e.g., United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
385 U.S. 293 (1966).
Id. at 302.
401 U.S. 745 (1971).
See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. at 302; United States v. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
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element." This is evident in two California cases, People v. Todd75 and
People v. Newton.76 Both involved electronic eavesdropping on conversations between arrested suspects in police cars. The appellate
courts ruled no violation of privacy because, in the words of the Todd
opinion: "Wle do not believe society is prepared to recognize his expectation of privacy to have been reasonable. Nor did the trial judge,
who noted it was unlikely for defendant to have concluded he was being placed in the police car for a sight-seeing tour of the city."'77 It is
apparent that the judges' attitudes were influenced by the fact that the
monitored conversations clearly established the guilt of the participants. The courts were not reflecting the societal expectation as to
whether police cars are electronically bugged, but the societal attitude
toward wrongdoers. The tone suggests the most dangerous possibility
in the reasonable expectation concept: Judges may feel it appropriate
to import their own perceptions of popular prejudice in their decisions.
The plausibility of turning to conventional morality as a standard
is founded on the role that community mores play in shaping the right
to privacy. It is the shared understandings of the community that establish the conventions by which it is understood just when others are
invited into our lives and when they are not.78 In our society, it is understood that a closed door will not be opened by others and that a
backyard will not be entered without permission, but this is hardly universal. These are certainly matters that are culturally determined.7 9 It
is one thing, however, to say that the boundaries of the private realm
are culturally determined and quite another to say that conventional
moral judgments of particular activities or people will determine
whether or not they have a right to privacy. Whatever the boundaries
of the private sphere, it is crucial that it provide a secure place from
which the demands of convention can be excluded.
What is finally obvious is that the reasonable expectation formula
is indeterminate enough to allow for the consideration of a whole range
of factors, which are frequently dealt with in an arbitrary or at least
subjective manner. Consideration of societal attitudes and "shared ex75. 26 Cal. App. 3d 15, 102 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1972).
76. 42 Cal. App. 3d 292, 116 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1974).
77. 26 Cal. App. 3d at 17, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
78. See Note, The Concept ofPrivacy andthe Fourth.4mendment, 6 MICH. J.L. REFORM
154, 178-80 (1972).
79. For some sense of the rich diversity in approaches to the maintenance of privacy,
see Roberts & Gregor, Privacy: A CulturalView, in NoMos XIII: PRIVACY (J. Chapman &
J. Pennock eds. 1971) [hereinafter cited as NoMos].
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perience"' ° as the basis for decisionmaking can lead to very casual reasoning. For example, the Court in Cardwell v. Lewis"1 found that
"[o]ne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle because its
function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as
the repository of personal effects." But what does transportation have
to do with privacy? Many cars serve as a repository of personal effects.
Certainly the privacy expectation in a car may be different from the
one in a home, but the degree of difference depends on the particular
car. What makes privacy expectations less in a car is the awareness
that cars are more vulnerable to a police stop and search.82 To take this
into account for determining a privacy expectation, however, is again
to make the law of privacy reflexive and thereby to place it at the mercy
of law enforcement practices.
The Cardwell language that gives the car less protection because it
is not a "repository of personal effects" gave rise to a whole realm of
law distinguishing between the container which is a common repository
for one's personal effects and the container which is not. The distinction was supposedly founded on the search for reasonable expectations
of privacy, the premise being that a common repository of personal
effects is inevitably associated with the expectation of privacy. But the
particular discrimination made-between the tote bag on the one83hand,
and the shopping bag on the other-is artificial in the extreme.
Bringing other values into the judgment of reasonableness of expectation can be used to expand as well as contract protection. This is
the approach of Professor La Fave, who, building on Professor Amsterdam's theory, interprets the judgment of reasonableness as a "value
judgment" requiring an assessment of whether or not allowing the police practice in question would diminish "'the amount of privacy and
freedom remaining.

. .

to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a

free and open society.' "84 To bring this test within the structure of the
80. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 155 (Powell, J. concurring).
81. 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
82. It was to this awareness that Justice Powell's phrase "shared experience" referred.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439"U.S. at 155 (Powell, J., concurring). See text accompanying note 80
supra.
83. The California cases making this tenuous distinction are collected in People v.
Halvorsen, 119 Cal. App. 3d 937, 174 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1981) (rejecting the claim of privacy
for a cloth bag with "Bank of America" imprinted on it). Such distinctions were disapproved in the Supreme Court's plurality opinion in Robbins v. California, 101 S.Ct. 2841,
2845-46 (1981) (Stewart, J.).
84. 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 66, at § 2.1(d) (quoting Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 403).
While Amsterdam seems to envision the value judgment as an alternative to the "reasonable
expectation," LaFave makes it clear that the value judgment is to be incorporated into the
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Katz test is to produce a hybrid both awkward and unnecessary. It is
awkward because the normative test requires protection even in the absence of any subjective expectation of privacy. Only an existing expectation, however, can be reasonable or unreasonable. It is unnecessary
because if "reasonable expectation" means an "expectation that a person ought to be able to form, whether he has or not,"85 then the whole
structure of reasonable expectation becomes expendable. There is no
greater clarity to be gained in "having the right to have certain expectations of privacy" than in "having the right to privacy." Indeed, there is
less clarity. What is needed is not a new way of dealing with the value
in reasonable expectations of privacy, but a new value: the distinctive
value ofprivacy as such. To argue that this is an exercise in questionbegging86 is only to assert that the exercise points to the new value
rather than elucidating it. To continue using the language of reasonable expectation, even with this addition, is to continue obscuring the
distinctive character of privacy values, and to risk further dilution of
their protection by those courts that continue to adhere to other concepts of reasonableness.
The uncertainty created by the susceptibility of the reasonable expectation theory to a great range of criteria, particularly to popular
prejudice, creates problems that are acute in dealing with the right to
privacy. Having some aspects of social life generally secure from social
censure is critical to the existence of private life, and it is the role of the
law to protect this security. To the extent that the law of privacy is
uncertain, it does not maintain this security and causes activity which
may attract social censure to be particularly vulnerable. As a result,
private life is diminished.
The contemporary development of the reasonable expectation theory has made Justice Black's expressions of doubt over the development of the right to privacy 87 seem prophetic. Where property once
offered a narrow, but at least secure, haven for private life, there is now
no firm haven at all.
B. Government Regulation of Private Life
The second major approach to privacy by the United States
Supreme Court arises from the newly developed area of protection of
process of deciding which expectations are reasonable. See I W. LAFAVE, supra note 66, at

§ 2.7(c).
85. See Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation ofPrivacy Test, 76 MICH. L.
Rnv. 154, 155-56 (1977).
86. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 66, at § 2.1(d).
87. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
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private matters from governmental regulation. What follows is a survey of the major opinions in this area that suggests differences from,
and affinities with, the approach taken by the reasonable expectation
theory. This section concludes that neither theory satisfactorily treats
the privacy right.
88
The second approach has its roots in Griswold v. Connecticut,
which held that marital sexual conduct is protected by the privacy right
and can be regulated only when necessary to promote a compelling
state interest. The reasoning of the four opinions written by the Griswold majority does have significant affinities with the reasonable expectation approach. These opinions emphasize the fact that the
government has fostered and supported the marital relationship and
has therefore raised expectations that it will be free from interference; 9
and suggest that privacy will be protected only in those relationships
that are approved by conventional morality.90 These opinions also suggest that married couples cannot be forbidden from using contraceptives because a'search for the evidence of use would be unacceptable. 9 '
What distinguishes this approach from the reasonable expectation theory, however, is the emphasis on the substantive importance of the activity that the state purports to regulate: the significance that the sexual
relationship has to a married couple justifies special protection. The
nature of this specialness is assumed rather than argued for, but the
intimacy, enduring quality, and sacredness of the relationship are accorded due respect. 92
Eisenstadtv. Baird,93 on the other hand, involved the regulation of
contraceptive use by unmarried couples. Because the marital relationship was not present, there was no government fostered reasonable expectation of privacy. The focus in Eisenstadt necessarily became the
substantive value of the choices being regulated, the significance of
which was again asserted rather than argued. The opinion framed the
question of the privacy right as the question: "the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
88. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). For further development of the constitutional significance of
the marital relationship, see Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
89. 381 U.S. at 499 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
90. 381 U.S. at 498-99.
91. Id. at 485-86.
92. Id. at 486, 495.
93. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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whether to bear or beget a child." 94 Just why this is so is not made

clear. The whole weight of the answer is borne by the phrase "so fundamentally affecting a person," but we are left to ponder whether this
refers only to the degree of the effect or to its quality, and if to the
latter, then just what it is about that quality which makes it
fundamental.
In Stanley v. Georgia,9 5 which involved the possession of obscene

films at home for private use, the Court again concerned itself with the
substantive significance of the privacy of the home: "[T]he right to satisfy [one's] intellectual and emotional needs in the privacy of [one's]
own home." 96 The privacy of the home is to be protected because it
offers the individual a shelter within which she can make choices as to
what she will watch or read free from the moral censorship of the community around her.
In Roe v. Wade, 97 which brought abortion within the protection of

the right to privacy, the analysis was decisively pressed in the direction
of making determinative not the special significance of the realm of life
regulated, but the felt seriousness of the intrusion of the state. After
cataloguing various decisions dealing with privacy problems, the Court
simply held that the right to privacy was "broad enough to encompass
the woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.19 8 In
elaborating, the Court described the degree of detriment suffered by a
woman when she is denied free choice in this field. 99

What remains, then, is the view that any government action which
imposes severe detriment on the individual falls within the right to privacy. It seems implausible, however, that the Court meant to go that
far, and perhaps the catalogue of cases that precedes the Court's discussion' °° is intended to set the rough limits on the spheres of privacy
within which severe detriment will invoke constitutional protection. In
94. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
95. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
96. Id. at 565.
97. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
98. Id. at 153.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 152-53. The Court cited cases in notes 101-06 infra and the following: Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (First Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
(Fourth Amendment); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (Fourth Amendment);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) ("penumbra" of the Bill of Rights); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (Fourth and Fifth Amendments). On the significance of
this list, compare Heymann & Barzelay, The Forest and the Trees: Roe v. Wade and its
Critics, 53 B.U. L. REv. 765 (1973) with Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. Rv.
1569 (1979).
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any case, substantive analysis as to why detriments of this sort are to be
taken more seriously than others of equal degree is completely lacking.
Privacy is equated either with cases of serious personal detriment from
governmental regulation'01 or with a list of activities and relationships
including marriage,1 2 procreation,10 3 contraception, 104religion, 0 and
the education of children,106 without further elaboration.
The character of the Roe approach becomes more clear when considered as a parallel to the reasonable expectation theory. Just as the
reasonable expectation approach focuses on the pain of having expectations disappointed, so the Roe opinion focuses on the pain of suffering
hardships that the government, by its regulation, denies us the opportunity to avoid. The limitations placed on the privacy idea relate to the
reasonable expectation analysis: Only those whose actions are within
the orbit of current community moral standards are to be protected.' 0 7
What is missing from both approaches is any concern for the distinctive
values that are at stake when privacy is intruded upon.
II. The Right to Privacy in California
A. Origins of the Right to Privacy
As noted above,108 California has an explicit constitutional, inalienable right to privacy and, therefore, need not depend on any United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of that right. The history of the
judicial elaboration of California's constitutional privacy right begins
with decision by the California Supreme Court in White v. Davis."°
hite involved an action by a professor at the University of California
against the Los Angeles Police Department, charging that his classes
had been subjected to surveillance by the police and asking for injunctive relief restraining such action in the future." 0 The trial court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, but the supreme court reversed,
101. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
102. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
103. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
104. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
106. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
107. This point was made in Justice Goldberg's opinion in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499
(quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)) and acted upon in
Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (denying the right of
sexual privacy for homosexual acts), a.ff'd mere, 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
108. See note 8 and accompanying text supra.
109. 13 Cal. 3d 757, 533 P.2d 222, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1975).
110. Id. at 762, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
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maintaining, among other things, that the action constituted a "prima
facie violation of the state constitutional right of privacy." ''
This conclusion was founded exclusively on reference to the argument made by the successful proponents of a constitutional amendment
to include privacy among the rights explicitly protected by the California Constitution. The argument was included in the official voter pamphlet distributed to the public when the amendment was on the
ballot." 2 That argument focused on the evils of growing government
surveillance and the compiling of dossiers on individuals by both government and business. The court declared these evils to be the "moving force behind the new constitutional provision."' "1 3 The court went
on to find in the practice of surveillance on university classes a case of
"government snooping" in its clearest form for the purpose of making
up "police dossiers."' 14 Thus, the allegations stated a "prima facie"
violation of the right to privacy, which could be met at trial either by
showing that the facts were not as alleged or by establishing that the
surveillance was justified by compelling state interests." 5
Just how much is to be made of the analysis presented here? It is
brief and casually reasoned, and perhaps is intended to do no more
than suggest the character of the argument to be made in the trial court
on remand. As an analysis of the constitutional privacy right, however,
the court's reasoning is strikingly devoid of reasonable expectation
analysis, moving directly from identifying the surveillance as "government snooping" to requiring a compelling state interest to justify such
action.
By relying on the voter pamphlet argument, which says that the
right to privacy should not be invaded unless the invasion is justified by
"compelling public need,"' " 6 the court seems to interpret the amendment as prohibiting "government snooping" in future cases, and reads
this case to be at the very core of the prohibition because the picture
painted by the allegations in the complaint "epitomizes the kind of
governmental conduct which the new constitutional amendment condemns.""'
The problems raised by this analysis of a constitutional
amendment which takes the language of the voter pamphlet as authority for the decision of cases, as if that language had been incorporated
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 776, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
at 774-75, 533 P.2d at 233-34, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105-06.
at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
at 775-76, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
at 776, 533 P.2d at 234-35, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106-07.
at 775, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
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into the constitution, are discussed later." s What is significant for present purposes is that no mention is made of "reasonable expectation."
Indeed, the focus is not on the individual whose right is violated, but on
the evil character of the government activity. 119
This focus on the government in White may be attributed to the
20
fact that it was a taxpayer's suit challenging illegal police conduct.
The assumption is that taxpayers have a right not to have their money
used illegally, and the court deemed the "snooping" and gathering of
dossiers without compelling justification to be illegal action. The conceptual difficulty here is that the action is illegal because it violates the
inalienable right to privacy.' 2 ' By reading the voter pamphlet language
into the amendment, the court ignored the fact that the only sort of
conduct declared illegal by the amendment itself is the violation of a
right. If the police conduct is wrongful as judged by the standard of the
amendment it must be because it violates the rights of privacy of particular people. A more adequate concept of those rights is essential to
elaboration of that standard.
Since White, the California Supreme Court has followed an uncertain but increasingly promising course in developing the right to pri22 the court limited the right of privacy to
vacy. In People v. Privitera,1
protecting us from the "government snooping" which had been the
principle concern of the court in White. Priviterainvolved the constitutionality of a ban on laetrile, and the court dealt with the issue of privacy protection by asking whether or not the voters, by amending the
constitution, intended to create "a right of access to drugs of unproven
efficacy."'" Of course, to ask such a question is to answer it. The court
perused the voter pamphlet and found no evidence of an intention to
"protect conduct of the sort engaged in by defendants."' 124 In effect,
then, it read the constitutional language, not as declaring the existence
of an inalienable right to privacy for Californians, a right to be given
whatever protection is necessary to maintain it, but as specifically
prohibiting surveillance and data collection by government and business. Preferring the language of the pamphlet to the language actually
adopted by the people, the court read the amendment as if it were a
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See text accompanying notes 125-28 infra.
White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d at 775-76, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
Id. at 762, 533 P.2d at 225, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 97.
See id at 773, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
23 Cal. 3d 697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949 (1979).
Id. at 709, 591 P.2d at 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
Id. at 709-10, 591 P.2d at 926, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
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simple and majestic statement of a
statutory prohibition rather than the
1 25
fundamental constitutional right.
In so doing, the court chose to ignore the material in the voter
pamphlet that described the right as: "[T]he right to be left alone. It is
a fundamental and compelling interest. It protects our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our
freedom of communion and our freedom to associate with the people
we choose."' 126 In this language, the sponsors of the amendment show

that they understood a distinction of which the majority opinion is innocent: the distinction between a fundamental human right and the
particular limitations on government conduct that are necessary to protect it. The voter pamphlet speaks of the right in affirmative terms,
broadly describing those aspects of our lives entailed in the requirement that privacy be respected. To say that we have a privacy right in
this sense is to say that the integrity of these aspects of our lives demands respect.
The voter pamphlet rhetorically refers to what the sponsors of the
amendment obviously regarded as the main immediate threat to that
27
integrity: snooping and data collection by government and business.'
It was natural for the sponsors to appeal to the voters on the basis of
what they understood to be an imminent threat of great popular concern. To limit the scope of the amendment to that specific threat, however, would be like limiting the First Amendment to seditious libel as
known in the eighteenth century, and the Fourth Amendment to writs
of assistance issued for the purpose of enforcing smuggling laws.
Elaboration of the specific standards that would ensure respect for
our private lives should include protections from snooping and excessive data collection, but they should include more than that. The court
apparently had forgotten that it was construing a constitution, an instrument designed to develop and grow over time. Limiting the language of a constitutional amendment to the specific problem which
may have given rise to it leads to a bill of rights that is no more than a
disparate collection of solutions to particular historically bound
problems, but that is not our constitutional tradition. The tradition
within which the voters surely knew themselves to be operating when
125. See id. at 740-41, 591 P.2d at 946, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 458 (Newman, J., dissenting).
See also People v. Davis, 92 Cal. App. 3d 250, 154 Cal. Rptr. 817 (1979) (Priviteraapplied as
basis for rejecting argument that the right to privacy protects cocaine use).
126. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CONSTITUTION 27
(Nov. 7, 1972) [hereinafter cited as California Voter Pamphlet], quotedin White v. Davis, 13
Cal. 3d at 774, 533 P.2d at 233, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
127. California Voter Pamphlet, supra note 126, at 27, quotedin White v. Davis, 13 Cal.
3d at 774-75, 533 P.2d at 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
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they amended the California Bill of Rights is one that takes rights
broadly and regards them as living concepts, capable of growth and
development over time. Thus, this body of rights is to be understood,
not merely as an arbitrary historical production, but rather as a general
view of what people are and how they ought to relate to one another, a
view that is to be worked out in detail by the courts in a case-by-case
effort to achieve a coherent practical embodiment of a philosophy of
man. It would take Professor Dworkin's imaginary Hercules 128 to live
up fully to this lofty conception of constitutional adjudication. Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court should not preclude itself, as it
nearly did in Privitera, from trying to achieve the ideal of a coherent
view of privacy.
B. Need for a Comprehensive Definition of Privacy
Happily, the court's apparent effort not to develop the right to privacy in Privitera has been abandoned. The court has not overruled
Privitera,but has simply ignored it in two recent and important cases:
City of Santa Barbarav. Adamson 129 and Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers. 3 ' The decisions in these cases firmly establish
that the California constitutional right to privacy does protect private
activity from interference.' 3 ' These cases open the way for a comprehensive approach; however, they offer strikingly little analysis.
This is particularly true of Adamson, in which appellants challenged a residential zoning ordinance that limited the number of unrelated people who could live in a house. 3 2 After citing White v. Davis
for the breadth of the privacy right, the court, as it had in White,
looked to the voter pamphlet argument for guidance as to just what the
right encompassed. Relying on a statement in the pamphlet to the effect that the right to privacy protects "one's home," 133 Justice Newman
stated that the "question now is whether that right [to privacy] comprehends the right to live with whomever one wishes, or, at least, to live in
an alternative family with persons not related by blood, marriage, or
128. R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1978).
129. 27 Cal. 3d 123, 610 P.2d 436, 164 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1980).
130. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
131. Justice Richardson, who wrote the majority opinion in Privitera,joined Justice Manuel's dissent in Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d at 138, 610 P.2d at 444, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 547, and
wrote a dissenting opinion in Myers, 29 Cal. 3d at 297, 625 P.2d at 806, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
132. 27 Cal. 3d at 126-28, 610 P.2d at 437-38, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 540-41.
133. Id. at 129-30, 610 P.2d at 439, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542. The assertion is supported by a
footnote citing the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Id. at 130 n.2, 610 P.2d at 439
n.2, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542 n.2.
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adoption." '34 Naturally, after this question is asked, one expects that
the nature of the privacy right will be explored further. Instead Justice
Newman supports his decision only by quoting from Justice Marshall's
dissent in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas:35
The choice of household companions-of whether a person's "intellectual and emotional needs" are best met by living with family, friends, professional associates, or others-involves deeply
personal considerations as to the kind and quality of intimate relationships within the home. That decision surely falls within36the
ambit of the right to privacy protected by the Constitution.'
This section of Newman's opinion then ends abruptly, and he next asks
whether or not the ordinance's incursion into privacy could be justified
by a compelling state interest.' 37
As is characteristic of opinions involving the right to privacy, positive articulation of the right is entirely missing from the analysis. Perhaps the point of these opinions is that the right can be invoked
whenever the regulation falls within one of the categories generally associated with the right, and any careful analysis is reserved for the discussion of the countervailing governmental interest. Certainly, this is
the pattern set by Justice Blackmun in Roe v. Wade.' 38 The result,
however, is that the crucial issue of the value structure supporting an
assertion of the right to privacy is never adequately explored.
The Myers opinion offers a little more. The case involved the right
to public funding for abortions.' 39 Because it has become so well-established that the abortion choice is a part of the right to privacy, the
court may have felt little need to develop the point further. What it
did, again characteristically, was to present a catalogue of concerns that
places abortion within the general realm of the right to privacy. The
court said that abortion impacts on the woman's health; falls within the
area of marriage, family, and sex; involves the woman's control over
her body; and involves the choice of whether or not to have a child, a
choice which affects
the woman's "control of her social role and per14
sonal destiny." 0
These concerns are all connected with privacy, and the emphasis
on establishing such a connection certainly raises the discussion above
134. Id. at 130, 610 P.2d at 439-40, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43.
135. 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (similar ordinance held not to violate Federal Constitution).
136. Id. at 16, quotedin City of Santa Barbara v. Adamson, 27 Cal. 3d at 130 n.3, 610
P.2d at 440 n.3, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543 n.3.
137. Id. at 131, 610 P.2d at 440, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
138. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
139. 29 Cal. 3d at 284-85, 625 P.2d at 798, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884.
140. Id. at 274-75, 625 P.2d at 792, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 879.
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the level achieved in Roe v. Wade. What is still lacking, however, is
any systematization of these various elements into a coherent structure
necessary to generate the reasoning needed to decide cases in other areas as they arise. Why, for example, was the claim of the right to use
laetrile in Priviterarejected? Whether or not to use laetrile is a decision
involving health, control of one's body, and control of personal destiny.
Is this not part of the right of privacy?' 41 That it is not in the area of
marriage, family, and sex, is not a sufficient answer. This is not to say
that laetrile use is part of the right to privacy, but simply to say that the
sort of argument used by the courts offers no reasoned basis for deciding one way or the other.
Whatever the California Supreme Court's failure in articulating an
explicit general theory of privacy, however, they deserve praise for
their development of a comprehensive approach to privacy in the informational sphere: An approach which displays an awareness that the
development of informational privacy rights must rest on a more general conception of what is particularly private in life and what is not.
In a series of cases the courts have extended the privacy right protection to include the records of everyday transactions in the hands of
large bureaucratic institutions. In Burrows v. Superior Court, 4 2 the
question was whether or not the police could obtain Burrows' bank
statements from his bank without a warrant. The court held that they
could not because a "bank customer's reasonable expectation is that,
absent compulsion by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank
will be utilized by the bank only for internal banking purposes."' 4 3 In
People v. McKunes,'4 the same approach was applied to the ability of
the police to obtain records of telephone calls from the telephone com4 5 obtaining records of
pany without legal process. In People v. Blair,"'
credit card charges from a credit card company was given the same
treatment.
Although the reasoning purports to be that of reasonable expectation, in each case the California Supreme Court reaches a different conclusion than the one reached by the United States Supreme Court as to
141. Such an argument was made by the court of appeals in People v. Privitera, 141 Cal.
Rptr. 764 (Ct. App. 1977) (upholding Dr. Privitera's right to use laetrile) rep'd, 23 Cal. 3d
697, 591 P.2d 919, 153 Cal. Rptr. 431 (1979), reprintedin People v. Privitera, 23 Cal. 3d at
712-40, 591 P.2d at 927-46, 153 Cal Rptr. at 439-58 (Bird, C.J., dissenting). See also Aden v.
Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 124 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1976) (striking down limits on the use of
electroshock therapy on a willing patient).
142. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974).
143. Id. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
144. 51 Cal. App. 3d 487, 124 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1975).
145. 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979).
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just what people expect from these bureaucracies.' 4 6 What the Califor-

nia court finds to be crucial is that records kept by these bureaucracies
reveal "many aspects of personal affairs, opinions, habits and associa-

tions. Indeed, the totality of bank records provides a virtual current
biography."' 4 7 It is clear that the focus is not on expectation of privacy,
but on the extent to which free access to these records would destroy
the capacity of the individual to have a private life.

It is apparent, in other cases as well, that the California courts
have imported a concern for protecting the substance of private life

into the reasonable expectation theory. This is true, for example, of a
series of cases involving police observation of marijuana cultivation.' 48
The language of reasonable expectation is used, and, for purposes of

aerial observation, the line is drawn between the backyard marijuana
garden and the marijuana patch in the wilds: the first cannot be subjected to aerial surveillance; the second can. 14 9 The reasoning is rather

strained. A backyard, we are told, is a place "expectedly private according to the common habits of mankind," and one who builds a
swimming pool in his yard "expects privacy. . . from aerial inspec-

tion." 50 Not so, however, with agricultural lands-such an expectation of privacy is "not consistent with the common habits of mankind
in the use of agricultural and woodland areas.'' 51 It is implausible to
think that there are any "common habits of mankind" with regard to
observation by overflight. In terms of risk analysis, any outdoor cultivation would be vulnerable; only indoor cultivation would be a suffi146. The United States Supreme Court's judgments as to what privacy bank and telephone customers reasonably expect are found in Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979)
(pen register on phone held not to be a "search") and United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435
(1976) (no Fourth Amendment interest in copies of checks and bank records after issuance
of subpoena).
147. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 597, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
148. People v. Lovelace, 116 Cal. App. 3d 541, 172 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1981) (plain view observation of marijuana plants in defendant's backyard through cracks in sarrounding fence
and from a vantage point not expected to be used by public at large held to be an unreasonable search); Burkholder v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 3d 421, 158 Cal. Rptr. 86 (1979)
(search conducted by aircraft from elevation of 1500 feet aided by binoculars not unreasonable, but a reasonable expectation of privacy protected petitioner from subsequent entry into
posted "no trespassing" area without a warrant); Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d
112, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973) (search conducted by low-flying airplane and later viewing
from a place where expectations of privacy had not been exhibited held not to violate Fourth
Amendment); People v. Sneed, 32 Cal. App. 3d 535, 108 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1973) (search conducted from a helicopter after it was determined that nothing could be seen from the road
held illegal without a warrant).
149. Dean v. Superior Court, 35 Cal. App. 3d 112, 116-17, 110 Cal. Rptr. 585, 589 (1973).
150. Id. at 117, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
151. Id. at 118, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 590.
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cient precaution to justify an expectation of privacy as reasonable.
Certainly, a remote woodland spot is less vulnerable than an urban
backyard. What is apparent to everyone, however, is that a backyard is
a place which is an integral part of private life in our society, while
agricultural lands are not.
The case that shows the greatest strain with regard to the reasonable expectation theory is the recent decision in People v. Lovelace.' 2
In this case the plants were seen by a policeman looking through gaps
in a fence from an alley. 5 3 The court made much of the fact that
Lovelace had recently repaired his fence to make it less easy to see
through: "The repair of the six-foot-high fence demonstrated that it
was objectively reasonable for appellant and his family to entertain
'
The problem is that the
such a subjective expectation of privacy."154
gaps the officer looked through, though small, remained in spite of the
repairs.' 55 Was not the risk that a policeman might look through the
knothole at least as great as the risk that one of Hoffa's co-conspirators
would be an undercover agent? 156 The answer seems to be that such
talk about the common habits and reasonable expectation are a vehicle
for the justices' individual judgments that backyards ought to be offlimits.
The same can be said of the trash can declared off-limits in People
v. Krivda 57 and of the doorless toilet stalls in People v. Triggs. 5 ' In
both cases, it is clear that the court was impressed by the extent to
which intrusions cut into private life. Trash identified as belonging to a
particular house can reveal a great deal about the life that goes on
within; 159 "private parts and bodily functions"' 60 are felt by all of us to
be intensely private.
If the reasonable expectation approach can be used as a vehicle for
such values, however, it may also be used to hamper their realization.
For example, the protection of Krivda can be undone in cases where
fellow tenants or neighbors share trash cans, although the contents of
the can could be, in such cases, just as revealing as in Krivda itself. 6 '
152. 116 Cal. App. 3d 541, 172 Cal. Rptr. 65 (1981).
153. Id. at 545, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 67.
154. Id. at 550, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
155. Id. at 551, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 70.
156. See note 71 and accompanying text supra.
157. 5 Cal. 3d 357, 486 P.2d 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62 (1971).
158. 8 Cal. 3d 884, 506 P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973).
159. 5 Cal. 3d at 366, 486 P.2d at 1268, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 68.
160. 8 Cal. 3d at 893, 506 P.2d at 238, 106 Cal. Rptr. at 414.
161. See People v. Stewart, 34 Cal. App. 3d 695, 110 Cal. Rptr. 227 (1973) (search of
trash upheld because deposited in apartment house trash can used in common by tenants);
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Similarly, the court held in People v. Blair16 2 that the telephone records,
which would have been inadmissible if they had been seized in California, are admissible in California courts because they were seized in
Pennsylvania. Blair had no reasonable expectation of privacy in Phila-

delphia that was violated by the seizure: "Since the search was legal
there, his expectation of privacy was not impaired under the laws of the
state in which he resided." ' This does not change the fact, however,
that the telephone records provide "a virtual current biography"' 164 and

therefore subject the individual to a serious diminution in privacy. If
the disappointment of expectations is the true core of privacy inquiry,
then it follows that the law of Pennsylvania, or any other state, can
define one's expectations, and therefore, one's right of privacy. Surely,
a superior definition of privacy is in order.
C. Toward Abandonment of the Reasonable Expectation Theory:
Privacy of the Pretrial Detainee

The

Two recent California court of appeal decisions have taken the
next crucial step: to free the right to privacy from the reasonable extheory. In People v. Maxie16 1 and De Lancie v. Superior
pectation
66

Court,1 there is the possibility that substantive privacy analysis may
emerge from behind the screen of "reasonable expectation."
De Lancie involved a taxpayers' suit challenging the constitutionality of a concealed system of allegedly indiscriminate electronic eaves-

People v. Superior Court (Barrett), 23 Cal. App. 3d 1004, 100 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1972) (search
of trash upheld because it had been placed in neighbor's trash can, though neighbor
consented).
162. 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979).
163. Id. at 656, 602 P.2d at 748, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 828. The records were seized by federal
agents in Pennsylvania. Id. at 654, 602 P.2d at 747, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 827. The court assumed that they would have been admissible under federal and Pennsylvania law. While
federal law under Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), would clearly legalize the seizure,
the court cited no Pennsylvania law that would establish its legality. In fact, as Pennsylvania
had recently adopted the California Burrows approach to bank records in Commonwealth v.
De John, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979), it seems at least as reasonable to say that Pennsylvania law would support an expectation of privacy in telephone records. Would one have
a different expectation of privacy in relation to federal agents than in relation to state agents
in such a situation?
164. See text accompanying note 147 supra.
165. 165 Cal. Rptr. 4 (Ct. App. 1980), hearing granted,Crim. No. 21556 (Sup. Ct. July 16,
1980). See note 9 supra, concerning the effect of the California Supreme Court granting a
hearing.
166. 159 Cal. Rptr. 20 (Ct. App. 1979), hearinggranted,S.F. No. 24095 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 29,
1979), argument, (Sup. Ct. Aug. 5, 1981). See note 9 supra concerning the effect of the
California Supreme Court granting a hearing.
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dropping on visits with pretrial detainees.' 67 In an appeal from an
order sustaining a demurrer to the complaint, the court of appeal determined that the plaintiffs had stated a valid cause of action under the
privacy clause of the California Constitution. In remanding the case,
the appellate court pointed out that it would be interested in hearing
the prison officials' explanation of why the violation of privacy was
justified by a "compelling governmental necessity," but stated that it
could not,
"without more," conceive of any justification for this
168
practice.
In Maxie, the question was whether or not evidence derived from
covert electronic monitoring of a conversation during a visit with a pretrial detainee could be used against the visitor.'69 The appellate court
found that the surveillance did infringe upon the visitor's right to privacy and that therefore the evidence should have been suppressed
under the privacy clause unless a compelling governmental interest in
Maxie are currently
surveillance could be shown. 170 De Lancie and
17 1
pending before the California Supreme Court.
A long series of cases before Maxie has held that the privacy rights
of prisoners and pretrial detainees are not violated when their communications with each other or with visitors are monitored by prison authorities. 172 The center of the analysis is, of course, the reasonable
expectation of privacy. 73 Because those who are incarcerated cannot
reasonably expect any privacy-surveillance being "the order of the
day"' 74 -- their right to privacy could not be violated; they had no reasonable expectations to disappoint. Whether or not they subjectively
expected their conversations to be private, reasonable persons, in167. 159 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
168. Id. at 27.
169. 165 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
170. Id. at 10.
171. See note 9 supra for a discussion of the procedural status of the cases pending
before the California Supreme Court.
172. See, e.g., People v. Suttle, 90 Cal. App. 3d 572, 153 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1979) (no reasonable expectation of privacy while in jail cell); People v. Santos, 26 Cal. App. 3d 397, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 678 (1972) (electronic surveillance of conversation over intercom telephone in jail not
illegal); People v. Boulad, 235 Cal. App. 2d 119, 45 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1965) (recording of
conversation between defendant and person in adjoining cell admissible), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 915 (1966). Cf. People v. Case, 105 Cal. App. 3d 826, 164 Cal. Rptr. 662 (1980) (no
expectation of privacy while in booking cage at jail); People v. Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d 292,
116 Cal. Rptr. 690 (1974) (no reasonable expectation of privacy while arrested and in patrol
car).
173. See, e.g., People v. Case, 105 Cal. App. 826, 835, 164 Cal. Rptr. 662, 667 (1980);
People v. Suttle, 90 Cal. App. 3d 572, 578-79, 153 Cal. Rptr. 409, 413-14 (1980).
174. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962), quoted in In re Joseph A., 30 Cal.
App. 3d 880, 884, 106 Cal. Rptr. 729, 732 (1973).
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formed about the nature of prisons and jails, would know that surveillance is pervasive. Only when the officials actually make
representations, contrary to those normal expectations will a detainee's
conversations in a particular case will be private, and it can be said that
results in the kind of injury that violates the right to
surveillance
175
privacy.
Although this reasoning was sufficient to justify rejection of the
claims on "reasonable expectation of privacy" grounds, these two cases
rejected the reasonable expectation theory itself using California's own
constitutional right to privacy as applied in 9hite v. Davis.17 6 The
court in Maxie suggested that to require the individual to show a reasonable expectation of privacy is to shift the burden of proof from the
prosecution in a way that violates constitutional values; 177 the court in
De Lancie stated that the reasonable expectation limitation simply has
no place in interpreting the California constitutional protection.17 8 Unfortunately, neither decision specified the ambit or character of the
right to privacy beyond that which can be gained from the facts of the
cases and from the statement in De Lancie that "[p]robably few other
human experiences evoke a greater need to engage in private communications with family and friends on a most intimate and personal
level." 179 This sentiment suggests that it is the character of the need for
privacy, rather than the expectation of it, that justifies its protection,
and further, that privacy has to do with intimate relationships. It is
clear that both courts regarded the violation of privacy in these cases as
too obvious to adumbrate. Justice Elkington, dissenting in De Lancie,
however, was apparently baffled by the notion that privacy rights could
exist in the absence of any reasonable expectations. 0 What is needed,
if these decisions are to stand, is a more extensive articulation of just
what is involved in a violation of the right to privacy if it is not the
disappointment of an expectation. The following section proposes a
formulation that is derived from an emerging theme of the privacy in
these California privacy right cases: The protection of private life.
175. This exception was established in North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 311, 502
P.2d 1305, 1311, 104 Cal. Rptr. 833, 839 (1972).
176. See text accompanying notes 109-22 supra.
177. 105 Cal. App. 3d at 915, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
178. 159 Cal. Rptr. at 25-26.
179. Id. at 27.
180. Id. at 28-29.
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III. The Right to Have a Private Life: A Proposal
A. Definition of Private Life
Attempts to define the right to privacy are numerous and many

8
have added greatly to our understanding of the concept.' ' It is sug-

gested, however, that they all err in one significant respect: They try to
define the term privacy. Such attempts assume that the idea of privacy
can be grasped, and that the right to privacy is the right to have privacy
protected. These attempts try to develop a brief
and easily applicable
18 2
formula that will delimit the idea of privacy.
The difficulty with this effort is that there is no clear substantive
concept lying behind the word "privacy" that can readily be subjected
to this sort of formulation. This is not to say that the idea of privacy is
without content, but that the term denominates a range of overlapping
situations. The multifaceted nature of privacy is part of the reason for
both the diversity of the formulas and for the appeal of the reductionist
views, which insist either that the right to privacy is nothing more than
a loose collection of various rights183 or that it protects nothing which is
not already protected by other rights.'14
Neither privacy nor the right to privacy can be reduced to a
formula; nevertheless, the right to privacy is a coherent idea with an
indispensible role to play. This is because it involves the protection of
a particular realm of life: the private life. 1 85 It is rich and various, not
only because this realm of life takes in a very broad range of activities
and states, but also because it involves a variety of kinds of protections.
In Hohfeldian terms,' 86 the right to privacy is a collection of discrete
rights that are held together by the fact that they are parts of what it
takes to protect the private life. All are human rights which we haVe
181. Among the major contributions are D. O'BRIEN, PRIVACY, LAW, AND PUBLIC POL-

icy (1979); Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475 (1968); Gavison, Privacyandthe Limits fLaw,
89 YALE L.J. 421 (1980); Gerety, supra note 2, at 237; Gross, Privacy andAutonomy, in
NoMos, supra note 79, at 169; Parker, .4 Defnition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 275
(1974).
182. Thus, Gerety seeks to identify the "necessary and sufficient conditions for any application of the concept," Gerety, supra note 2, at 235.
183. Prosser, supra note 11, at 389.
184. Thomson, Yhe Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 295 (1975).
185. The European approach is to focus on private life rather than privacy. For example, the European Convention declares that "[e]veryone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence." European Convention on Human
Rights, Nov. 4, 1950 at art. 8, para. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. See generally PRIVACY AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (A. Robertson ed. 1973).
186. W. HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS (1923).
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because we have a right to privacy-a right to have a private lifewhich is worthy of respect.'" 7
This conception of the right to privacy does not by any means take
into account all cases in which people would say that they want something to be private. On the contrary, part of the strength of this view is
that, in taking the position that the "right to privacy" is a conception to
be explicated by means other than the definition of the word "privacy,"
it is a view that frees us from the need to deal with every use of the term
"privacy" in ordinary language, and allows us to concentrate on those
cases in which the right to privacy protects a value special to it.
What is the idea of the private life? It is a commonly shared conception of those aspects of our lives that we identify most immediately
with ourselves-those aspects that are not subject to the strictures of
formal roles and that could not be subjected to them. 8' Specifically,
these are aspects of life that could not exist under such strictures. To
subject them to these constraints would be to destroy that which gives
them their most significant quality.
This is not to say that people could not do the things which make
up the content of these aspects of life even under restriction or surveillance, but that they would lose their defining characteristics under
those circumstances. Nor is this true only in the trivial sense that something is not private when it is observed by, or controlled by, the public.
Certainly it is true in one not very interesting sense that walking or
chewing gum when no one else is present are private activities, and that
when someone else comes on the scene they cease to be so. But it is
characteristic, indeed it is the crucial characteristic, of the activities and
conditions of which I am thinking that they be private.
For example, intimacy cannot exist except in privacy. Intimacy
involves a consciousness that precludes an awareness of the presence of
outsiders; experiences which might be experiences of intimacy simply
89
cannot be when we are made conscious of the presence of "others."'
So too, friendship ceases to be friendship when its conditions are im187. On the other hand, Prosser's catalogue includes rights that arise from another source
and are connected with each other only in that they all protect against injuries that fall
somewhere within the broad range of the phrase "to be let alone." Prosser, supra note 11, at
389.
188. See Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHIcs 76 (1978); see also Gavison, supra
note 181, at 443 ("Some human activities only make sense if there is some privacy").
189. See Gerety, supra note 2, at 268; Gerstein, supra note 188. Gerety gives intimacy a
sufficiently broad definition to embody the whole of what I have described as the private life,
but his definition, "the consciousness of the mind in its access to its own and other bodies
and minds, insofar, at least, as these are generally or specifically secluded from the access of
the uninvited," Gerety, supra note 2, at 268, seems too indeterminate to be very helpful,
though it does suggest the kind of experience connected with the private life.

416
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posed upon us rather than arising spontaneously. This is not to say that
we could not become friends with those who are imposed upon us, but
rather that the process of becoming friends itself cannot be imposed. If
a situation can be described as one in which friendship is imposed and
regulated, it is not really friendship but a kind of imitation that lacks
the crucial characteristics of the real thing. The same can be said of
love, and, more broadly, of such aspects of human life as self-discovery
and creativity.
It also follows that not every action which has an impact on the
realm of private life is an invasion of the privacy right. To talk about
an activity or a place as private does not mean that no aspect of it can
ever be limited or regulated. The privacy of the intimate relationship
between lovers is not destroyed by the prohibition on their killing or
assaulting one another. That is because this prohibition does not destroy the intimate and therefore private character of the relationship. 90
So too, it does not invade the privacy of a vacation trip to regulate the
driving of one who is taking the trip. It would destroy its privacy, however, if the destination of the trip and activities on arrival there were
predetermined. 191 So it is that the privacy of the home does not mean
that nothing connected with inhabiting a home can be regulated, but
only that, by-and-large, a home should be regarded as safe from intrusion. If, on the other hand, there is reason to believe that the home is
the scene of a crime, or if it is a place in which people are employed, 9 2
it loses its immunity to that extent. Even the body itself is not entirely
immune. Our common sense experience tells us that our bodies are not
the center of the idea of privacy, and that not every interference with
the body is an invasion of privacy.' 93
Certainly, we have a right to bodily integrity, which is the basis for
our right to ward off assaults and which requires the government to
justify in some manner any physical interference. Such an interference,
however, violates the right to privacy only to the extent that it is by
190. So it is plausible to distinguish between searches of "the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives," Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
419, 485 (1965), and searches of these same precincts for the telltale signs of violence.
191. Thus the generalized statement that an instrument of travel involves less of an expectation of privacy and therefore less privacy protection, as in Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974), misses the peculiar characteristics of the structure of private life.
192. See, e.g., Annenberg v. Southern Cal. Dist. Council of Laborers, 38 Cal. App. 3d
637, 647, 113 Cal. Rptr. 519, 526 (1974) (held picketing of a private home by domestic employees allowable because "the household enters in a limited degree into the economic marketplace" and loses its "isolation" when domestics are hired).
193. Parker, supra note 181, at 280-81, focuses his notion of privacy on the body, arguing
that privacy is "control over who can sense us." Id. at 281.
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nature an interference with private life. This is true of prohibiting
abortion and of any interference with our sexual life.' 94 It would also
be true of any search of the body that is aimed at disclosing some aspect of private life, or that involves the "private parts," denominated
private because the intensity of their connection with our private lives
makes any imposed disclosure of them a potential invasion of private
life itself.'95 For example, compelling an examination involving the
massage of the prostate gland in order to disclose a venereal disease is a
clear invasion of privacy.196 On the other hand, although ordering the
removal of bullets from the body of a victim to determine what gun
an invasion of bodily integrity, it is not an invafired them is certainly
97
sion of privacy. 1
It is not only these more significant activities and states which belong to the private life, however. A great deal of private life is made up
of things that are in themselves quite trivial, but no less significant for
such a life and no less dependent on privacy for their special character.
These are the activities of everyday private life: dressing, undressing,
washing, eating, reading, and so on. Private life would be severely impoverished if only the central experiences of intimacy and self-discovery were protected, because even these central experiences would
wither without protection afforded to these less central moments. That
is, one quality of the central experiences is their spontaneous character
and their tendency to color and be colored by the less central moments
that surround them. A private life that consists only of scheduled periods of intimacy, for example, is clearly grossly impoverished. 98 Not
only does it lack the flavor that is given to what most of us know as
private life by our capacity to play out the little spontaneities and eccentricities of our daily lives without regulation or surveillance by
others, it also loses all that can be gained from being able to enter spontaneously into intimacy or creativity.
194. For discussions of the right to privacy of sexual life and arguments that, contrary to
the suggestion of Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), af'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976), the right should not be restricted to behavior that is conventionally acceptable, see Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the ConstitutionalRight to Privacy, 30
HAsTnos L.. 957 (1979).
195. See Gerstein, supra note 188, at 80. Gerety, supra note 2, at 269, writes suggestively
of "an intimate body."
196. See People v. Scott, 21 Cal. 3d 284, 294, 578 P.2d 123, 128, 145 Cal. Rptr. 876, 881
(1978) (held that this procedure requires especially strong justification because it involves
"the most intimate of bodily functions, traditionally and universally regarded as private").
197. See People v. Browning, 108 Cal. App. 3d 117, 166 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1980).
198. There is an element of this scheduled intimacy in prison life. See text accompanying notes 220-29 infra.
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This broad miscellany of activity does not consist of a set of specifically enumerable acts that would not retain their character if they were
not private. Tying shoes and showering are still tying shoes and showering whether carried on in private or before others. It is clear, however, that these activities and others like them can have a special
character as part of a private life, which they lose if they are watched
and regulated: A quality of unselfconsciousness that significantly contributes to the secure sense of our own identity which we need in order
to have the more profound and significant experiences of privacy spoken of above. Taken together and in context, they are the essence of
ordinary private life.
There is no way to give privacy full protection through an enumeration of specifically protected activities and relationships. The particularly important aspects of private life can and should be enumerated
and given explicit protection. Beyond this, however, what is needed is
a reserve within which the larger organism of private life can be allowed the space to breathe and develop; in short, the home and its
equivalents are needed. It is on this reserve that the right to privacy
has been traditionally centered, and with good reason.1 99 Whether we
are owners or occupants or casual visitors, it is essential to the security
of private life that those places dedicated to private living remain presumptively secure from intrusion.
B. Why the Private Life Needs Special Protection
One of the crucial points about the right to privacy is that it is not
defined in terms of the particular means by which an invasion of privacy might be carried out. The question, therefore, is not whether the
government is seeking information about you or attempting to regulate
you, but whether whatever the government is trying to do would signif2
icantly hamper your capacity to have a full private life. 1
Just what sort of government interference is forbidden will depend
on the particular case. Sexual intimacy is disrupted either by regulation or surveillance. The question with regard to abortion, however, is
not whether the operation can be carried on in private, but whether the
person involved will retain the capacity to make the autonomous decision to have it or not.
In both cases, the broad goal is the same: To maintain the integrity of our familial and other intimate relationships. The fabric of pri199. See Note, supra note 85, at 180-81.
200. Thus, contrary to Gross, supra note 181, at 181, our right to privacy is violated
whether the government seeks to "regulate [our] personal affairs . . . [or] get acquainted
with them." See Henkin, PrivacyandAutonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
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vate life can be destroyed either by surveillance or control. What the

courts have developed as two separate aspects of privacy do, in fact,
protect the single entity of private life from these two distinct sources of

danger. Resistance to surveillance of private life does not have its origin in values separate from those on which resistance to regulation of
private life is based; the difference arises only from the various ways in
which the complex structure of private life can be attacked by
government.

It follows, too, that some, but by no means all, assertions of a right
to keep information private (which here simply means keeping others
from having access to it) are necessarily authentic assertions of the right

to privacy. Claims to keep information private may be asserted in order to allow government decisions to be made better 201 or to support
the rehabilitative role of punishment. 2 2 In neither of these cases, however, would the right to privacy be implicated, as it would where the

desire is to keep information private in order to maintain the integrity
of private life.203
It is also a mistake to regard any detriment to our health 2° 4 or to
the environment 20 5 as an invasion of privacy. To do so is to stretch the

concept of privacy out of all proportion and to lose touch with the values that it is aimed specifically at protecting-precisely as the Court did
201. But see United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
202. See, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866 (1971).
203. Although the California courts have not always distinguished those cases in which
individuals have a right to keep information private to protect their private lives from those
in which such a right is invoked for other purposes, see, e.g., Briscoe v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1971), a number of cases manifest a
special concern for information about private life. Compare People v. Elder, 63 Cal. App.
3d 731, 134 Cal. Rptr. 212 (1976) (acceptable for the police to gain name and address from
utilities), with Burrows v. Superior Court, 13.Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166
(1974), People v. McKunes, 51 Cal. App. 3d 487, 124 Cal. Rptr. 126 (1975), People v. Blair,
25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 778, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979) (ruled to be a violation of the right to
privacy for the police to get information amounting to a "a virtual current biography" from
banks, credit card companies, or utilities). See also Gunn v. Employment Dev. Dep't, 94
Cal. App. 3d 658, 156 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1979) (held that it would violate the right to privacy to
deny unemployment benefits to a woman who refused to say whether she was pregnant).
204. The court of appeal in People v. Priviterahad taken this view, finding the right to
use laetrile to be a part of the comprehensive right "to be let alone." See note 141 and
accompanying text. See also Aden v. Younger, 57 Cal. App. 3d 662, 129 Cal. Rtpr. 535
(1976) (a violation of the patient's right to privacy by requiring reading of "informed consent" information to a "responsible relative" prior to administering shock treatment to willing and competent mental patients).
205. See Van den Haag, On Privacy, in NoMos, supra note 79, at 149, 154.
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in Roe v. Wade." 6 The right to privacy is not aimed at protecting every
aspect of the quality of private life, but precisely itsprivate character.
An uncomfortable private life is still a private life. A life lived under
constant observation or regulation is not.
Only when an action inhibits, or is aimed at inhibiting, our capacity to lead a full private life is the right to privacy violated. The right is
violated, however, whenever this occurs. When the intimacy of friendship is disrupted by surveillance aimed at detecting crime, a part of
private life is annihilated. If the state were to try to impose a relationship upon us, for example, in the form of an undercover agent, this
assertion of the capacity to control our private ives would be a violation of the privacy right, even if the relationship imposed happened to
blossom into genuine intimacy.
The idea of the private life necessarily involves control, the capacity to make choices or act spontaneously without social constraints.
This does not mean, however, that the private life can be defined in
terms of control or that the right to privacy is simply the right to control
access to ourselves in general. That view suggests, counterintuitively,
that when we make our private lives known we are exercising the right
to privacy by choosing to expose ourselves, and not diminishing the
private aspect of our lives at all.2 17 The notion would be then that
every one of our actions is an exercise of the right to privacy in one
direction or the other, and that our public life is simply the consequence of our decisions to exercise that right in a particular way. In
this sense, the public aspect of our lives is just as characteristic of, and
perhaps more natural to, our lives than is the private, because it is only
by establishing
limiting rituals that the private realm is constituted as
8

private.

20

It seems unnecessary and artificial to say that when we appear in
public we are exercising the right to privacy. It is more plausible simply to say that the right to privacy is the right to have a private life, and
that having a private life involves having a significant measure of
choice, both as to when we will retreat from the public realm and how
and with whom we will lead our lives in the private realm. This also
seems more plausible than the view that privacy is simply the same
thing as exclusion, so that solitary confinement and a hermit's life are
206. See notes 97-107 and accompanying text supra. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 197 (1973) ("woman's right to receive medical care in accordance with her licensed
physician's best judgment," is part of the right to privacy).
207. This view is held by Gross, supra note 181, at 170.
208. See Reiman, Privacy,Intimacy and Personhood,6 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 26 (1976).
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both equally cases of perfect privacy. 20 9 Common sense, as reflected in
judicial decisions,21 0 instead points to the idea of privacy as a matter of
living with and among others.
It is only after the general nature of the right to live a private life
has been understood that the reasonable expectation issue arises. If
there is a question as to whether a person has in fact exposed some
aspect of his presumptively private life to the public, or to any others
beyond his private sphere, he might respond that the others in fact penetrated his private sphere in spite of the fact that he took reasonable
precautions to avoid this. The question then is whether those precautions were 21reasonable as judged by the common sense of the
community. '
The primary and central question, therefore, is whether or not a
person's opportunity to lead a private life has been interfered with; it is
only in responding to the assertion that it has been interfered with that
the question of reasonable expectation arises. To treat it otherwise is to
misconceive the nature of the injury involved in the violation of the
privacy right and to mistake a minor aspect of the right for its core.
Some earlier pretrial detainee cases had made this mistake.21 2 The
court of appeal in Maxie was quite right in saying that these earlier
decisions have wrongly placed the burden of proof on the defendant by
requiring that a reasonable expectation of privacy be shown as the basis of a privacy claim against the government. 213 The question of reasonable expectation should not arise until it has been shown that the
individual had the option of maintaining the privacy of his private life.
It is a cruel joke to deny a claim that the right to privacy was violated
on the basis that the claimant was placed by the government in a position where he could expect them to deny him the minimal respect due
his humanity, or in which he would not even develop a sufficient sense
of that humanity to challenge such a denial.
Why is private life deserving of a special sort of protection? For
one thing, it needs a special sort of protection if it is to continue to exist.
Unlike other sorts of activities or states, it literally withers away when
brought out into the open or subjected to regulation. Further, it plays a
209. See D. O'BRIEN, supra note 181, at 15-17; Gavison, supra note 181, at 428 ("[A]n
individual enjoyspeifect privacy when he is completely inaccessable to others" (emphasis in
original)).
210. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 102-06 supra.
211. See Note, supra note 85, at 168-70.
212. See text accompanying notes 172-75 supra.
213. See People v. Maxie, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 10.
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very important role in our lives. It is one of the major constituent elements of individuality.
Our private lives individuate us in two ways. First, because in our
private lives we can act spontaneously without regard to the constraints
imposed by convention and the judgments of others, we have the greatest opportunity to be different from others. Second, developing these
differences in our private lives gives us the individuality we can bring
to encounters in public life. If we express ourselves creatively in our
work, for example, it is because we have selves to express, and the private life is essential to the development of these selves.
In particular, it is in privacy that we are able to develop the resources necessary to be morally autonomous, persons whose moral values are genuinely our own. Without the opportunity to develop moral
values in our private lives, we would have little opportunity to go beyond the values embodied in the formal roles we play and in the expectations of those we relate to through them. Moreover, the likelihood is
far greater that we would be unable to make judgments other than
those required by the conventions of our positions. The capacity to
develop a moral point of view which is authentically our own requires
the opportunity for reflection, discussion and action, within the sphere
of private life.2 14
It is the fragility of private life, and the nature of values that are at
stake when it is threatened, which make it so elusive. The spurious
appeal of finding that a violation of the right to privacy is just a disappointment of an expectation of privacy is that we can identify the harm
as being of a familiar sort, a kind of pain. There is also a misleading
tendency to identify some sort of offense or injury to the sensibilities as
21 5
the element of harm.
While a violation of the privacy right may well injure sensibilities
and cause pain, that pain is not the core injury that makes the action a
violation of the right to privacy. The core injury is instead the destruction of some aspect of private life, or the denial of some opportunity to
2 16
live it. It is true that corporations should have no right to privacy,
214. See Gerstein, The Demise of Boyd: Seif-IncriminationandPrivatePapersin the Burger Court, 27 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 343, 348-49 (1979).
215. See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal. 3d 259, 268, 466 P.2d 225, 231, 85
Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1970) ("the right of privacy concerns one's feelings and one's own peace of
mind").
216. Ion Equip. Corp. v. Nelson, 110 Cal. App. 3d 868, 878, 168 Cal. Rptr. 361, 366
(1980) ("A corporation is a fictitious person and has no 'feelings' which may be injured in
the sense of the tort").
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but this is not just because they lack our sensibilities; it is because they
lack all of those capacities that go into having a private life.
Can this view be identified as the one enacted by the people of
California into their body of constitutionally protected rights? Certainly there is some reason to believe that this protection of private life
is exactly what they believed themselves to be adopting. The idea of
the sanctity of private life has a long tradition in the United States, 1 7
and this tradition forms the foundation for the view taken here. Further, that tradition is alluded to in the argument for the amendment,
which quotes Brandeis' well-known reference to the right to privacy as
the "right to be let alone."2 ' There is also the breadth of the statement
that the right protects "our homes, our families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our personalities, our freedom of communion
and our freedom to associate with the people we choose."2' 19 Though

loosely stated, this is a fairly complete statement of those aspects of life
intuitively connected with private life, either as a part or as arising
from it.
California courts have, under cover of the reasonable expectation
doctrine, moved a considerable distance toward the view developed
here. Maxie and De Lancie provide an opportunity to throw off the
cover.
C. Application of the Private Life Theory: Privacy of the Pretrial

Detainee
The reasonable expectation approach denies the existence of a
right to privacy in prison. 2 0 The assumption of universal surveillance
not only destroys any basis for claiming a right not to be watched or
listened to, it also supports the view that "the penumbral right of privacy enunciated in Griswold can have no more application in the set22
ting here involved than could the right to bear arms." '
217. See D. SEIPP, THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1977).
218. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV.193, 193 (1890).
219. California Voter Pamphlet, supra note 126, at 27.
220. In its most recent pronouncement, in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 557-58 (1979),
the United States Supreme Court was unwilling either to endorse the classic view of Lanza
v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962), or to reject it: "It may well be argued that a person
confined in a detention facility has no reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to his
room or cell and that therefore the Fourth Amendment provides no protection for such a
person." Cf., Lanza, id. at 143-44 ("In any case, given the realities of institutional confinement, any reasonable expectation of privacy that a detainee retained necessarily would be of
a diminished scope").
221. People v. Frazier, 256 Cal. App. 2d 630, 631, 64 Cal. Rptr. 447, 447-48 (1967).
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The total denial of the right to privacy in prison does at least reflect a perverse awareness of the connection between the two sides of
privacy theory. In responding to a recent claim that the Griswold right
to privacy does not cover sexual activity among prisoners, a court of
appeal pointed out that "since appellant's participation in the acts or
oral copulation occurred in a 12-man cell of a county jail, he cannot
reasonably assert an objective expectation of privacy as to his sexual
behavior. '222 Because there was no opportunity for privacy, and therefore no expectation of privacy, the sexual activity cannot be regarded as
private and can therefore be prohibited.
The approach suggested here reverses the process. Starting from
the premise that everyone has the right to a private life, and that this
right ought to be respected, even in prison, the question must be
whether or not it is justifiable to imprison people under conditions in
which they are wholly denied the opportunity to have private sexual
relations. The answer to this question may not be easy to get at. The
assertion of a right to sexual privacy in prison comes up against the
traditional assertion that constant physical surveillance is essential to
prison security. Private life in prison will be restricted severely as compared to private life outside of it, but that fact cannot support the assumption that private life in prison cannot exist. The crucial point is
that respect for the right to privacy requires us to give a very strong
justification for such a severe narrowing of private life. The assumption must be that the right to privacy is as necessary to people in prison
as it is outside of prison. The question is just how private life is to be
shaped to a particular context. This puts the right of privacy on a footing with all other rights.22
The focus in pretrial detainee cases is on a single limited aspect of
private life inside prison, the maintenance of personal relationships
with those outside prison. It is clear that the needs of security limit the
maintenance of these relationships to the form of a structured visit.
Spontaneity of encounter with friends or lovers from outside is precluded by the impossibility of allowing people to come and go freely.
There must be a right to such visits, however, at least with those who
have an especially close and intimate tie with the prisoner. A Califor222. People v. Santibanez, 91 Cal. App. 3d 287, 290, 154 Cal. Rptr. 74, 76 (1979).
223. See Giannelli & Gilligan, Prison Searchesand Seizures, 62 VA. L. Rav. 1045, 1074
(1976), contending that "the burden of establishing the existence of institutional interests
requiring less Fourth Amendment protection in prison should be carried by the state." The
California Penal Code provides that a person imprisoned be deprived "of such rights, and
only such rights, as is necessary in order to provide for the reasonable security of the insitution in which he is confined and for the reasonable protection of the public." CAL. PENAL
CODE § 2600 (West Supp. 1981).
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nia court of appeal recognized this right by holding that visits from
children could not be completely prohibited consistent with the constitutional guarantee of privacy.224 Long-term intimate relationships always have been rightfully at the heart of privacy protection,225 and it
should take a very compelling state objective to justify denying the opportunity to maintain those relationships to those who are in jail awaiting trial.
If there is a right to have visits in order to maintain long-term
relationships as a part of private life, the next question is whether and
to what extent these visits may be observed by the officials. The starting point must be the assumption that part of the right to have and
maintain such relationships is the right to the intimacy which is a very
significant part of them. If it is true that intimacy must by its nature be
only for those engaged in it, and cannot survive the consciousness of
observation, then part of the right to intimacy must be the right not to
be observed in intimate situations. 26
To what extent can this right be realized in the context of imprisonment? There are jurisdictions, including California, in which it is
accepted in its amplest form: the conjugal visit.227 In others it is realized only to the extent that the conversations of the prisoner and the
visitor cannot be heard, though they can be visually observed. 228 The
recognition of the right to have a private life to the extent that it can be
realized under conditions of imprisonment means that the conjugal
visit should be regarded as the standard form of visitation, except to the
extent that security requirements compel a more restrictive form. It is a
crucial aspect of private life that requires a compelling justification for
its denial.
Where visual observation of visits has been accepted and it remains only to determine whether electronic eavesdropping on conver224. In re Smith, 112 Cal. App. 3d 956, 169 Cal. Rptr. 564 (1980). Recognizing the need
for security, but recognizing as well the continued existence of the right to maintain the
parent-child relationship, the court in Smith held that it was up to the jail authorities to
formulate "rules and regulations that will reasonably insure safe and secure child visitations." Id. at 969, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 570. The California Penal Code declares the right of
those incarcerated in state prisons to "have personal visits" under restrictions justified by the
needs of security. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2601(d) (West Supp. 1981).
225. See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 495, 511 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
226. See text accompanying note 189 supra.
227. For a discussion of the conjugal visit and the literature relating to it, see Singer,
Privacy,Autonomy, and Dignity in Prison, 21 BUFFALO L. REv. 669, 707-10 (1972).
228. This was the case in Marie, where the visit was carried on in a room with a window
between inmate and visitor and a wall of one-way glass through which guards could observe
the visit. 165 Cal. Rptr. at 5.
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sations is allowable, the limits of intimacy maintenance have been
reached. Intimacy is minimally possible provided that the conversation
remains private, but where there is surveillance of conversations it is
virtually impossible. If surveillance is openly announced, any sense of
intimacy will wither, except for those few capable of blocking the consciousness of the listener from their minds, and even for those people,
there is the degradation of knowing that their intimacy is available for
the casual scrutiny of others. If the surveillance is clandestine, intimacy is not immediately disrupted, but the participants are being misled about a fundamentally important aspect of their lives. If their
conversation becomes intimate, then the violation of their dignity as
people is particularly serious. Suppose a situation in which each of us
were clandestinely watched by others through all of our private lives.
Even if we knew nothing of the watching, our rights would be violated,
precisely because we would have been degraded from participants in
intimacy to objects of observation. We can all imagine what we would
feel if we discovered that this had happened to us, and it is apparent
that what is felt on discovery is not only the pain of the recollections of
intimacy being contaminated by the new awareness of the watcher, but
also indignation at the fact of the observation, a sense that we were
wronged by it though we were not aware of it at the time.
The judicial authorization of indiscriminate surveillance of conversations with visitors involves the virtual obliteration of any chance
for intimacy between the prisoner and those outside the prison with
whom he has long-term relationships. While it has been asserted in
general terms that private conversation between prisoner and visitor
would not be consistent with the security discipline of the institution,9
it is not at all clear why this should be so. Surveillance might be justified in a particular case because of information that shows a special
need for it.230 Such surveillance would not violate the right to privacy
because appropriate respect is shown to the right when the invasion of
private life is justified in terms by which those who suffer should rea229. See North v. Superior Court, 8 Cal. 3d 301, 308-09, 502 P.2d 1305, 1309, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 833, 837 (1972). That the federal system can do without such surveillance is shown by
the following comment from the Bureau of Prisons: "Eavesdropping and monitoring of
conversations between prisoner and inmate are not condoned by the Bureau." 45 Fed. Reg.
44,228 (1980).
230. InMaxie, the court of appeal held that the state must establish "the necessity of this
particular intrusion." 165 Cal. Rptr. at 11. The California Department of Corrections requires that the privacy of prison visits between inmates and visitors "will not be imposed
upon except as is necessary for the identification of persons, and to maintain order and
acceptable conduct, and to prevent the introduction of items, commodities or substances
which inmates are not permitted to possess." CAL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 15, R. 3170(f) (1979).
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sonably accept. Further, the exceptional and limited character of the
invasion leaves the general sense of the security of private communication intact.

Conclusion
The courts of California have done much to give protection to private life in the last decade. What underlies many of their decisions is
an appreciation of the inherent value of private life that transcends and

ultimately conflicts with the "reasonable expectation" language that is
still predominant in their opinions. The pending cases involving surveillance of pretrial detainees present the California Supreme Court
with an opportunity to break out of the "reasonable expectation" mold
and begin to shape a coherent body of doctrine out of the materials
already discernable in their privacy decisions. It is to be hoped that

they will take this opportunity to begin to articulate a unified theory for
California's right to privacy.23

231. Any such work is threatened, however, by the proposal to do away with the California courts' capacity to exercise independent judgment on the exclusion of evidence, now
pending before the state legislature. A proposed constitutional amendment that would accomplish this purpose, Senate Constitution Amendment 7, has passed the California Senate
and is pending in the State Assembly along with Assembly Bill 1155, which attempts to
achieve the same effect by statute, and other similar measures which are likely to be considered by the Assembly Criminal Justice Committee in 1982. California Legislature at Sacramento, 1981-1982 Regular Session, Senate Weekly History, Oct. 6, 1981, pt. 2 at 627;
Assembly Weekly History, Oct. 2, 1981, pt. 2, at 602. There is also a proposed initiative
measure a provision of which would effectively have the same effect. As of early November
1981, its supporters had collected half of the signatures needed to put the initiative on the
ballot. L.A. Daily Journal, Nov. 9, 1981, at I, col. 1. Such action would again effectively
sever the two aspects of the right of privacy from each other, federalizing search and seizure,
while leaving the problems of regulation of private life to the state courts.

